CTO Chronicles

More Musings on MS and Managed

Interop remained all atwitter about MS NAP, and the press articles continue.  Joel Snyder had a webcast on Network World, where MS NAP was the main topic.  We've got a whitepaper up on the same topic, and Alan Shimmel continues to post as well.  There are nits that I could pick with just about everybody (e.g., most recent Cisco gear is perfectly capable of running per port ACL's), but I want to try to stay as high level as possible.  Here are the big-picture things I still see missing from the discussion:

Device Discovery

Whatever governance coverage NAP brings (Greenstein's comments are well taken here), it brings that governance for Vista and XP 3 machines owned and managed by the organization.  That leaves an extremely broad swath of devices, both specialized and general computing, outside the NAP umbrella.  Snyder mentions using MAC based authentication and external device profilers to help; but for many organizations with highly dynamic networking environments, just getting the list of printer MAC addresses (much less badge readers, PDA's, security cameras, the list goes on) is a daunting task.  And having an(other) external tool map and profile devices strikes me as a science experiment run amok.  It seems to me that it is critical to have a built-in device discovery and profiling mechanism.  It goes without saying that the discovery mechanism must also be impervious to host based firewalls, transparent to the physical connection, and indifferent to address assignment.

Post Admission

Just when I thought post admission security was in, they pulled it back out.  What's up with this seriously?  Gartner, Forrester, Frost & Sullivan, Tim Greene over at NWW all seem to agree that NAC encompasses (or at least should encompass) policy enforcement throughout the endpoint's network lifecycle.  The TCG announced a new specification last week aimed specifically at post-admission security.  Yet the bulk of Snyder's talk completely ignores post-admission monitoring and enforcement.  Even the perennial and predictable "blah-blah is dead" post from Stiennon assumes that no NAC solution offers post-admission security beyond the occasional re-scan.  Not so, folks, just not so.  Good post-admission security not only provides flexibility with respect to pre-admission policy, but also provides a means to verify what the endpoint just told you was true.  It's not rocket surgery, for heaven's sakes.  OK, it sort of is, but we're really good at it.

Adaptive Enforcement

Should enforcement be through VLAN placement or ACL assignment?  The truth is that as long as you're in the boat of not being able to change or modify the initial decision it doesn't really matter.  Say an endpoint joins the network and needs remediation.  So it gets put in the remediation VLAN (or has a remediation-specific ACL applied to its port), and gets automagically remediated.  Now what?  How does the endpoint get placed into the "you are now a good endpoint" VLAN (or have the "you are now a good endpoint" ACL applied to its port)?  The answer is that, absent not-so-great methods like CLI or SNMP, the mechanism doesn't exist.

I'm picking (mainly) on NAP here, but really all software/infrastructure based NAC solutions assumed managed assets and are therefore in the same boat.  You have to have some mechanism to discover and profile devices currently on your network; you need the backstop of post-admission security; and you have to be able to change/revoke an endpoint's access as its compliance status changes.  We can argue about a whole litany of things (enforcement methods, device management, policy lifecycle, etc); but none of it is really relevant those three basic needs are met.

Microsoft Takes a NAP on Non-Managed Devices

Since the release of NAP compatible 2008 server ostensibly inaugurated this blog, I thought this week would be good time to revisit the big hairy beast that is Microsoft NAP.  While it's true that our (read: my) primary focus around infrastructure-based NAC is biased towards what the IETF ratifies, we remain NAP partners and continue to follow its progression.  One of the more common RSA questions, from press, analysts, and booth visitors was how we (specifically) and NAC pure plays (generally) compete with Microsoft NAP.  The answer, of course, is that we don't.  And the smart ones won't even try.  Here's why:

First, it's worth exploring what NAP is, what it isn't, and where its focus lies.  While some amount of "NAC is stupid/dead/bad" hay has been made over the number of NAC "Standards" offered, the truth is that CNAC, MS NAP, and TNC don't really differ by all that much.  They all look to leverage the initial authentication event to glean endpoint data characteristics; they all have a model for both granting and gating a level of network access based on the combination of endpoint characteristics and user identity; and they all have a fundamental presumption that the endpoint has the capability and willingness to run the endpoint software to make the declarations.  They presume what's connecting to your network are general purpose computing devices, with general purpose operating systems, managed by you, the IT organization.

Now, what's wrong with that model?  The answer, really, is nothing, so far as it goes.  Governing access to your network for your general-purpose computing assets is definitely a problem for you to solve.  MS NAP, with all of it's tradeoffs, is as likely to solve this problem for you as anything else is.  But controlling access for assets you *don't* own, as well for assets that you own but that are specialized in their function (printers, security cameras, cash registers, HVAC controllers, badge readers, the list goes on) is also a problem for you to solve.  Reasonable people can disagree over what percentage this is, and the percentage likely varies by vertical in any event, but that it is "some number greater than zero" is a slam dunk.

This is really where pure play vendors come in, and why (at least here) we openly welcome the advancements of NAP/TNC/NEA.  I've believed for a while now that you will govern your internally-owned desktops and laptops with something other than us.  Symantec.  McAfee. IBM.  Microsoft.  Juniper.  That's a good list; go to it.  But remember the "courage, serenity and wisdom" prayer?  You not only need a solution that brings governance to the class of non-managed (both unmanaged and unmanageable) devices, but you also need one that has the wisdom to know the difference.  The basic visibility of detecting and classifying what's connecting to your network is a tough thing to make a must have or to wrap ROI around (around which to wrap ROI?  Honestly, some times it's just better to end with a preposition).  But the truth is that discovery and classification do have value, and are critical pieces of any kind of reasonable NAC policy (They may be critical for an unreasonable NAC policy, but I try not to worry with such things).

So, what you get with NAP is governance for the Windows Vista and Windows XP SP3 devices that you own and administer.  What you don't get is governance for anything else.  That's a perfectly fair tradeoff, and a perfectly appropriate thing (I think) for Microsoft to go off and solve.  But what's left?  Why might you want some other (granted, integrated) NAC solution to help?  Here's why:

State:  What's on your network?  The importance of answering this basic question can't be overstated.  At least in all the environments I've ever had to manage, it's a moving target.  Minute by minute, second by second.  Which means that robust, real-time state of all devices is the first step.

Classification:  An extension of the above, this is where you get an additional level of detail about the endpoint, as well as when you split between, say "MS NAP" devices and "Non MS NAP" devices.

Post-Connect Monitoring:  Wheels within wheels.  This not only helps make your network safe by providing another layer (importantly, defined within the same management console, under the same policy construct), but it also gives some flexibility on making the front-end admission decision.  Reasonable people continue to disagree over whether organizations will accept a NAC policy that restricts at entry based on what many consider to be IT failures (firewall, patch, AV status), and Microsoft's own internal NAP deployment called out that tension.  A strong monitoring policy post-connect is the best way to cross that chasm.

Integrated Rollups and Status:  Duh

Enforcement:  Duh. See previous post and don't forget the C.

Ticking Away the Moments

(Errata Notice:  When I read the entries on Steve's blog, my eyes interpreted shanna as "Shanna;" and I incorrectly assumed that someone else at Juniper had posted an entry in Steve's blog.  I've corrected the entry below.  My apologies to Steve and my thanks to Chris Radkowski for pointing out my error.)

So, I've been in a discussion with Steve Hanna over on the Juniper NAC blog about the state of TNC NAC standards within the IETF (Steve's initial post that spurred my comment is here; his response post is here).  Network World's Tim Greene also had a newsletter item on the same topic.  Setting aside that Tim's view is necessarily more pessimistic than Steve's, there is no doubt in my mind that progress on the standards front is a good thing for all NAC vendors.  A rising tide that lifts all boats.  The strong-armed quarterback that completes the West Coast Offense.  The Turn card that completes the flush.  You get the idea.

Steve's initial post was around IETF's acceptance of the TNC client-server protocol definitions.  My follow-on question involved the progress, if any, of standards adoption for the enforcement pieces.  Steve's response was both helpful and encouraging, and I look forward to reading additional details as they come.  I'm not looking to minimize the importance of standardizing client-server communication within a NAC framework. However, we continue to impatiently tap our fingers waiting for a similar level of progress on the enforcement front.  The reasons for this are (a) it's "easier," at least politically, since there is broad agreement as to where enforcement should be done; and (b) enforcement puts the C in NAC, since there can be no control without enforcement.  As is obvious, NAC without the C just becomes NA.  Not an acronym (abbreviation, actually, but that's a whole other rant) that any of us wants.

Now, to be sure, every NAC vendor in the space claims "some" kind of enforcement capability, including Mirage.  And it remains more likely than not that at least some of these enforcement mechanisms remain relevant post standards adoption, for unmanaged assets if nothing else.  After all, whether you're talking about NAP, TNC, NEA or some kind of hybrid, the enforcement elements look pretty much the same, which is to say based around a RADIUS authentication handshake, which holds a two-fold assumption that the asset is (a)managed by the organization and (b) capable of running some kind of host-based software (VPN client, 802.1x supplicant).

Still, for that class of managed assets running host-based software, I don't believe there is significant disagreement that RADIUS extensions are the way to go.  RFC 3580 was great, in that it defined a standard way of providing VLAN assignment and port-based filters to connecting users according to the policy defined on the RADIUS server.  The missing piece is the ability to change those attributes post entry outside the context of an authentication handshake.  This is important not only for post-admission security but also for remediation, since remediation by definition changes the status of the endpoint.  By extending the traditional RADIUS Packet of Disconnect to be a more generic Change of Authorization, RFC 3576 fills this gap, seamlessly, across switching platforms, and for all connection methodologies (wired, wireless, VPN).

So, what's the holdup?  I honestly have no idea.  As Steve points out, RFC 3576 is 5 years old now.  5 years.  5.  Five.  Why hasn't the unknown-pantone-blend switching company (Are they gray?  Blue?  Green?  Pick one!) just gone ahead and implemented it?  It would sell more of their switches.  It would keep them a relevant player in the NAC arena irrespective of whatever else happens (see above).  And it's just the right answer.  My hope is that Juniper (now that they're in the switching business), along with maybe Enterasys, will provide the competitive push that is clearly necessary.  Hope is good.  Hope springs eternal.  Time, I suppose will tell us whether Hope fell down and sprained her ankle.  Let's just please make the time something less than another 5 years.

The ROI of Freedom

As with all things security related, one of the primary challenges for NAC adoption is the proof of some sort of quantifiable ROI model.  While there are some "hard" elements out there (Brand Protection is certainly one; I haven't been in or even met an IT organization yet that wants its company's name in the papers), the real truth is that it's squishier than that.  After all, security is really about peace of mind, about enablement, about freedom.  Where's the ROI in that?  How do you quantify the ROI of playing catch with your kids in the yard instead of fighting yet another malware outbreak (or data breach, or outage, or whatever) at work?  There are likely some productivity gains you can point to, but no job is without its TPS Reports, so even that's a slippery hook on which to hang your hat.

In the end, and at its best, freedom is really what controlling network access should really be about.  It should be about enabling rather than disabling.  It should be about managing the risks of doing business on your network in recognition of the simple fact that your network exists to do your company's business.  It should be about empowering IT organizations to say "How," in recognition of the simple fact that they can't say "No."  We're analogy heavy here at Mirage, and analogies abound within the walls of the company, both for the NAC space generally and for our product specifically (most have to do with either poker or college football but that's a different blog entry).  A common analogy used by me and others has been that NAC (generally) and Mirage (specifically) are essentially the TSA of networks, ensuring safe network travel.

In many ways this fits.  People are going to fly (recent bankruptcies and flight cancellations notwithstanding), and do fly to the tune of some 2 million travelers in the air every day.  Moving that many people through the air has risks, both at a micro and macro level.  You manage the risks as best you can.  You find the best balance that you can between security of travel and doing of business. And that's really as good as it gets.  However, given the average grumbling from the average person in the average security line, no one really wants to associate himself/herself with TSA.  The analogy used at Oasis that I really liked is that we're the guys (er, I mean people) on the skydiving plane checking your chute before you jump.  We're not there to keep you from jumping out of the plane; we're there to see that you do it as safely as is possible.

At RSA, we introduced this notion in a new campaign.  Free your network.  Free your people. Free your business.  Free your world.  Leverage NAC to say How, so that you can quit trying to say No.  Let them jump, knowing that we've checked their chute and they're going to be fine.  Then go home and play with your kids.  Or on the Wii.  Or Dungeons and Dragons.  Whatever it is you do when you're not at work.

Advertogs

(Note:  In this brave new world of making up words rather than learning the words we have, I thought I would introduce one of my own:  advertog, which I define as a company advertisement disguised as a blog entry.  An example of such an animal is below.)

Case Study - Vandelay Industries

Vandelay Industries, an industry-leading manufacturer of best of breed latex products, implemented Network Access Control (NAC) from Mirage Networks to ensure endpoint compliance across its enterprise network and protect its networks from day-zero malware.

Vandelay Industries has direct operations in 43 countries, across 6 continents.  Its state-of-the-art latex manufacturing facilities, located in Sao Paulo, Brazil, Memphis, TN and Taipei, Taiwan make heavy use of embedded OS devices to run the manufacturing line.  Vandelay Industries is also a IP Telephony customer, leveraging IP based phones in all of its locations.  Finally, Vandelay employs a direct latex sales staff of over 500 people, and provides hoteling facilities at all of its major branch locations around the world.

"We evaluated a broad range of NAC solutions available in the market place," said Kel Vansen, Vandelay's Chief Security Officer.  "The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) based NAC solutions we tried, not that there's anything wrong with the protocol, disconnected our IP phones.  Similarly, inline enforcement contained too many latency and availability risks, and the large number of embedded OS devices in our environment precluded any kind of wide-scale agent-based solution.  Mirage's virtually inline approach was the perfect fit."  "It's the best, Jerry!  The best!" added Keny Bania, Director of IT Security.

With a large online catalog of latex products available for direct sale, Vandelay Industries also had a strategic PCI compliance initiative.  Yet simply finding and tracking the servers responsible for financial transactions was proving problematic for Vandelay's on-demand business model.  "By the time we could compile the list of financial servers, the list was stale.  Latex is big business," said Kosmo Kramer, Global Compliance Director.  "Mirage allowed us to govern the use of service ports across all endpoints on the network and implement the spirit as well as the letter of PCI.  Mirage made us masters of our domain.  Giddyup!"

Manageability and reporting were also key concerns.  In an effort to cut costs and improve efficiency, Vandelay merged the Network Operations and Security Operations Center staff across the 4 dedicated centers worldwide.  "With our reduced staff, we needed some shrinkage in the number of deployed management tools," noted Vansen.  "Mirage's ability to integrate with existing security and network event management tools was a key factor in our decision."  The global compliance group also leverages Mirage's report infrastructure to deliver timely reports to compliance auditors, greatly increasing the productivity of the compliance team.  "Prior to implementing Mirage's solution, compliance audits made us all want to quone." said Mr. Kramer.  "We have serenity, now."

Happy April 1, everyone.  Remember to have some fun out there..

Best in (NAC) Show

How much do you think I can bench press?

As a long time Snoopy fan, I was happy to see a beagle win the big prize this year.  And of course, it's impossible for me to watch any conformation show without thinking of Best in Show, a fine piece of cinema and one of the 10 funniest movies ever.

I bring it up here because the oft-seen blog fights and PR battles between and among NAC vendors is eerily reminiscent to me of the infighting among the owners and handlers of Winky, Beatrice, Hubert, Miss Agnes and Rhapsody in White.  For example, few things raise rankles faster and begin more quickly an argument over whose NAC product has a better tail than the old "Pre vs Post" battle.  Now, two things are immediately clear.  First, anyone who disagrees with our approach is clearly adle-minded.  Second, anyone who buys "some other" NAC product is clearly wasting their time and money and will end up back at the pet store.  Having said that, I think reasonable people can disagree.

Truly, it does seem clear that there are governance problems to solve, regardless of the label attached.  If, for example, I have a governance rule of no "network services" (ITunes Shares, Web Servers, FTP Servers, etc) on workstations, how is that governance policy less relevant an hour into a laptop's network session than it is when the laptop connects to the network?  Likewise, if my policy is that machines accessing corporate financial applications are not allowed to run peer-to-peer applications, a behavioral check on whether the machine establishes a peer-to-peer connection seems to make sense.  In whatever functional bucket, it's a governance problem to solve.  By whatever name, it's a sweet smelling pooch with a nice bushy tail.

Indeed, at least one of the NAC standards (TNC) anticipates the idea of changing/revoking access rights during the course of a network session.  As we continue down the path of a "Unified NAC Standard," it's difficult to imagine that standard without some notion of post-admission checking.  Perhaps that will settle the argument and those of us who are still around can compete on things like service, management ease, price and the cleanliness of our teeth.  Until then, just think of it as a governance problem to solve.  You can solve it our way, or some other way.  You can solve it as part of a Network Access Control Project, or as part of a Controlling Network Access Project.  What seems clear is that you'll have to solve it.

More Strategery, Less Crappery

In exchange for a permanent reprieve from Starbucks Duty, I promised my CEO that I would start a blog when MS released 2008 Server. Needless to say, I was pretty sure I'd be dead (or at least fired) by then. Well lo and behold, Microsoft managed to hit the (OK, this) date, so here I am. Does the release of MS 2008 Server portend the wide scale adoption of NAC? I certainly hope so, though I frankly can't help but remember that RFC 3580 compliant RADIUS servers have been out for a little while now. Not that the MS NAP initiative is without merit; after all, one can find something to like in any 106 page Visio diagram. Seriously, doesn't it seem like they could simplify it just a little bit? Cisco, for example, went from their own, err, large diagram to embedding "Simple" right there in the acronym.

So what really happens? The industry, much like political punditry, has no shortage of experts who are happy to tell you. Though no one has a crystal ball, and predicting correctly can be a challenge. Compare, for example, NAC predictions for 2007 to the pre Super Tuesday Zogby poll that had Obama leading in California by 13 points. Still, in the interest of not having to remember whether "non-fat" comes before "no whip," I just asked my own Magic 8 Ball whether 2008 will be the year of NAC.

The answer:  "Absolutely."  In the end, though, I think the answer will depend on the industry itself.  We need more strategery and less crappery.  At least part of me thinks that means we need fewer arguments over who builds a better mousetrap, and more open discussion on why organizations might not want mice to begin with.  Yet  what we heard consistently at OASIS (which was awesome, BTW, so thanks to all the customers, partners, analysts and press that attended) was that organizations get the basic value pitch for NAC; they need it in a package that is reasonable to deploy, comes at a reasonable cost and provides reasonable investment protection.  The pure play vendors have a much better story on the first two, if only because it's been more of a focus; the large vendors, by contrast, have little on the first two but get to default on the third.

And therein lies the rub, and brings us full circle to MS NAP and the release of 2008 Server.  I believe that the path for the pure play vendors to provide assurances of investment protection lies in the implementation of NAC standards, or at least one of them.  MS NAP, NEA and TNC all have common elements to them.  The challenge before us is to articulate a path through the standards soup, and provide both a vision and a product that is implementable today and relevant tomorrow.  Easy enough, right?

Absolutely.